
Tuesday, April 5, 2011
Three Schools Less is Three Buildings More

Greece Produces Turkish F-16 parts
Greek daily Ta Nea claims that on April 1st, Greek Aerospace Industries (HAI) shipped four pieces of fuselage to Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) in Turkey. These parts will be assembled in Ankara to form new F-16 Fighters for Turkish Air Force. TAI assembles F-16 planes in contract with Lockheed Industries for Turkish use.
Ta Nea notes that these fighter planes might be used in dogfight with Greek aircraft over Aegean airspace with Greek parts. Years ago when the production started in Turkey, Greek Air Force has demanded an investigation about the possibility of Turkish parts, and tried to find ways to exclude such parts in Greek Air Force F-16's.
Lockheed officials said that all F-16 parts are produced according to same standards around the world in certified facilities with the lowest possible cost.
The news found their way into Turkish papers' headlines today.
Sunday, April 3, 2011
Keratea in our minds...
Thursday, March 31, 2011
"Virtual" Disobedience

A few years later police raided an Internet news portal's offices in Istanbul with suspicion that journalists working there might be co-conspirators with Ergenekon organization.
Ahmet Şıks Book on Internet
Ahmet Şık’s book on Fethullan Gülen’s movement and activities in Turkish bureaucracy which caused his arrest is being distributed on Internet. Original file was posted at Google Documents. A court in Turkey has ordered all copies must be destroyed or it would be considered as a terrorist crime raising International upheaval about press freedom in Turkey.
Here’s the book:
Wednesday, March 30, 2011
Is Social Media New Opium of the Masses?

Sunday, March 27, 2011
Turkey's Time Lost
Phone ringing woke me up today. It showed 7:35 am. When I hung up the phone I checked the time on my Mac. It was 8:40 am. What we should have done on March 27th that we didn't? Were we supposed to put the time one hour ahead? Were we supposed to put it one hour back? For some time my watch awaits me in another city, so I don't have a wrist watch, and no other mechanical clocks at home. I totally lost track of time in that half-asleep state of mind.
It took me some time to realize the time was supposed to be moved forward for one hour, but it wasn't due to an executive order in Turkey, but my Mac ignoring all-powerful executive orders put its time one hour ahead while my iPhone listened to the signal from my cellular provider and kept the "correct" time for the country.
It took me some time to realize the time was supposed to be moved forward for one hour, but it wasn't due to an executive order in Turkey, but my Mac ignoring all-powerful executive orders put its time one hour ahead while my iPhone listened to the signal from my cellular provider and kept the "correct" time for the country.
Saturday, March 19, 2011
On Libya and US Foreign Policy
I'm not an expert on Libya. Both politically or sociologically. But, in my humble opinion, the recent developments as I write this piece within a few hours of UN intervention against Qaddafi forces, it constitutes an interesting chapter in US Foreign policy since President Obama implemented serious changes from the beginning of his presidency.
His administration aimed at several objectives best summarized by Z. Brzezinksy in his article "From Hope to Audacity" published on Foreign Affairs:
Every sign in US politics since the beginning of Middle Eastern revolutions, and even the stand-off in Wisconsin showed us that the administration was ill-prepared for such a major change in the region. The quick contamination of the Tunisian movement to the neighboring countries in the Middle East, even as far as Azerbaijan and Armenia in some extend, caught all western capitals unprepared for such a change even for the Information Age.
In his assessment of Iran-American relations, Brzezinski stresses that "The wider the agenda -- one that addressed regional security issues, potential economic cooperation, and so on -- the greater the possibility of finding acceptable quid pro quos. Or should Iran be treated as if it is fated to remain a hostile and destabilizing power in an already vulnerable region?" Given the fact that maintaining the stability in Middle East is the highest of all priorities (not only because of the "oil problem" but also because an instability in the region increases sensitivity among the G-7 economical relations) blossoming revolutions in every certain corner of the region should have been an incredible challenge for any policy maker, let alone the bureaucratic conundrum of the United States.
Hence the seemingly long reluctance on both the Libyan and Bahraini affairs. The US worked really hard in the United Nations in cooperation with France to get that 10-0 vote and keep the abstaining 5 abstaining.
In his article Brzezinski notes the deterioration of US relations with Europe due to the internal aspirations of the leaders of latter countries for the last decade or so. It now looks like the administration got the better end of the stick even to create better cooperation and collective unity among historical partners.
And then there is Libyan people. It's rather traditional to perceive any American International action with suspect at least. In the Libyan case, although the open cry for help by the people against Qaddafi forces was eminent and NATO action was backed with a concrete UN resolution and Arab League approval, many Middle Easterners started the chorus of Imperialistic attack against Libyan people immediately. The chorus spans even different and complex political divides of the countries in the region.
Yet Libyan crisis still holds the key to change the image and lebensraum of western politics once and for all. First intervention forces should avoid any action resembling an invasion. Second, both as an example to other dictatorial nations in the area, and maybe backed by another umbrella resolution to include likes of Yemen and Bahrain, UN should extend its protective sphere in all the countries affected by legitimate mass protests against undemocratic regimes.
If and only then the blood shed in Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain and Libya could come close to be shed not in vain and western civilization could regain the credibility it lacks for some time now.
His administration aimed at several objectives best summarized by Z. Brzezinksy in his article "From Hope to Audacity" published on Foreign Affairs:
•Islam is not an enemy, and the "global war on terror" does not define the UnitedIn the rest of his articles which is the most comprehensive and current study on the matter that I had a chance to read, Brzezinksi briefs every major area of US foreign policy including only Palestine/Israel conflict in the Middle East.
States' current role in the world;
•the United States will be a fair-minded and assertive mediator when it comes to
attaining lasting peace between Israel and Palestine;
•the United States ought to pursue serious negotiations with Iran over its nuclear
program, as well as other issues;
•the counterinsurgency campaign in the Taliban-controlled parts of Afghanistan should be part of a larger political undertaking, rather than a predominantly military one;
•the United States should respect Latin America's cultural and historical sensitivities and expand its contacts with Cuba;
•the United States ought to energize its commitment to significantly reducing its
nuclear arsenal and embrace the eventual goal of a world free of nuclear weapons;
•in coping with global problems, China should be treated not only as an economic
partner but also as a geopolitical one;
•improving U.S.-Russian relations is in the obvious interest of both sides, although this must be done in a manner that accepts, rather than seeks to undo, post-Cold War geopolitical realities; and
•a truly collegial transatlantic partnership should be given deeper meaning, particularly in order to heal the rifts caused by the destructive controversies of the past few years
Every sign in US politics since the beginning of Middle Eastern revolutions, and even the stand-off in Wisconsin showed us that the administration was ill-prepared for such a major change in the region. The quick contamination of the Tunisian movement to the neighboring countries in the Middle East, even as far as Azerbaijan and Armenia in some extend, caught all western capitals unprepared for such a change even for the Information Age.
In his assessment of Iran-American relations, Brzezinski stresses that "The wider the agenda -- one that addressed regional security issues, potential economic cooperation, and so on -- the greater the possibility of finding acceptable quid pro quos. Or should Iran be treated as if it is fated to remain a hostile and destabilizing power in an already vulnerable region?" Given the fact that maintaining the stability in Middle East is the highest of all priorities (not only because of the "oil problem" but also because an instability in the region increases sensitivity among the G-7 economical relations) blossoming revolutions in every certain corner of the region should have been an incredible challenge for any policy maker, let alone the bureaucratic conundrum of the United States.
Hence the seemingly long reluctance on both the Libyan and Bahraini affairs. The US worked really hard in the United Nations in cooperation with France to get that 10-0 vote and keep the abstaining 5 abstaining.
In his article Brzezinski notes the deterioration of US relations with Europe due to the internal aspirations of the leaders of latter countries for the last decade or so. It now looks like the administration got the better end of the stick even to create better cooperation and collective unity among historical partners.
And then there is Libyan people. It's rather traditional to perceive any American International action with suspect at least. In the Libyan case, although the open cry for help by the people against Qaddafi forces was eminent and NATO action was backed with a concrete UN resolution and Arab League approval, many Middle Easterners started the chorus of Imperialistic attack against Libyan people immediately. The chorus spans even different and complex political divides of the countries in the region.
Yet Libyan crisis still holds the key to change the image and lebensraum of western politics once and for all. First intervention forces should avoid any action resembling an invasion. Second, both as an example to other dictatorial nations in the area, and maybe backed by another umbrella resolution to include likes of Yemen and Bahrain, UN should extend its protective sphere in all the countries affected by legitimate mass protests against undemocratic regimes.
If and only then the blood shed in Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain and Libya could come close to be shed not in vain and western civilization could regain the credibility it lacks for some time now.
Labels:
Arab Revolution,
democracy,
Egypt,
European Union,
Libya,
United States
Sunday, March 6, 2011
Freedom, freedom of press, or otherwise

And truth is a dangerous subject matter in Turkey.
Nedim Şener is rather known in local and International media as an investigative journo and with his recent books on the background of Hrant Dink murder.
So, I will concentrate on Ahmet Şık and his work, and attempt to shed some light on why this case is becoming a stage in the series of actions by Turkish state to oppress opinion makers in the country.
Ahmet is another investigative journalist whose kind is rarely seen in Turkish media. He has an academical and scrupulous attitude towards his work, and in spite of common tradition in Turkish maid, he always works with the evidence and try to reach the truth no matter what the rewards or the dangers of doing so. He has co-written a book about Ergenekon in Turkey, about ultra-nationalistic and interventionist formations within the military. But he was also very critical on the details of Ergenekon indictment for lacking the real connections between the organization and latest crimes of hate and discrimination in the country.
Last, but of course not the least, he has a finished but not published book on the religious community of Fethullah Gülen and their connections within the state mechanism. And a draft of this book "surfaces" in the computers of other journalists accused of being Ergenekon members.
This morning he was arrested by a court claiming that, Ahmet Şık, a Marxist, was a member of an ultra-nationalist organization and "to arouse animosity and hate in public in general".
The only evidence so far known to connect Ahmet to this organization is a draft of a book found in an other journalist's computer who is yet to be convicted of any connection to this organization himself. Second accusation; "to arouse...." is an open-ended and undemocratic code in itself. One can prove that, say against myself, in many articles written by me, here on this blog. Freedom of expression does not cover only love letters. Writing in itself is provocative, and loses its purpose when stripped of its fervor. This article covers an area left behind since the latest changes in criminal law in Turkey, which traditionally served to oppress any and every kind of opposition in the country.
Many journalists in Turkey as well as many International organizations are considering these arrests as a violation of freedom of expression and slam Turkish government with requests to modernize laws concerning freedom of speech. I agree, but my point for the sake of this article is different.
I have just learned that all questions asked to him during interrogations and arraignment were concerning his writings. The facts about his work, his investigations, and the manner the investigations were handled by the prosecutor's office, leaves one but only one conclusion: Ahmet Şık was arrested for his opinions and for the dangers the status-quo perceived as a result of his investigative work. The court did not come up with one single conceivable evidence other than hearsay or opinions of other suspects.
And now, obviously, one could think "what about the previous arrests?" Just because they had more nationalistic views why wouldn't we give them the benefit of doubt?
As a rule of thumb, when a system loses its validity in judicial proceedings, and if a system does not function on presumption of innocence and starts chain-accusing people based on the actions of non-convicted others, one cannot speak of a fair jurisprudence.
And when there is no law to trust, there cannot be freedoms in the modern sense because they are dependent on who you are and where in time you are.
Let alone freedom of the press.
Labels:
Ahmet Şık,
fascism,
Freedom of Expression,
human rights,
Turkey
Saturday, February 19, 2011
Spiral of Obsession
Every state has its own layers of protection to ensure its continuation. In modern democracies its a mixture of constitutional law, criminal law and traditions. Depending on the roots of the particular state these protective conventions differ a great length from one entity to another. For example in the United States, these issues are handled in Federal Law. In UK, traditions play a bigger role. In Greece, democratic ideals are so preemptive in written articles of law that, tradition and ideological extremities play a role of checks and balances on certain issues.
Turkish Republic, from its beginnings, and in resemblance with its predecessor Ottoman Empire, has had different layers of protection from defined or loosely accepted enemies. Although these have changed as times changed and priorities shifted, certain common denominators remained unchanged in its progress. Here, the idea on the center is the perception that the state is above the interest of all its citizens. State is a fatherly figure taking care of its "subjects", and knows "what's best for them" even better than any individual. When you extend the state that far, surely its "protection" would be a complex structure.
At this stage we see the "personification" of the state and the concepts that are related to it. On the outer sphere there are the usual suspects; laws against spying and acts of un-patriotic behavior. People are seldom caught by that net because these kind of accusations need through investigations and solid evidences against the accused. On the second layer there are the specific laws that derive from the "personification" of the state and its past and present representatives. As if the government is not elected by the people and for the people, they are continuously protected from the people including the civil servants. Even moral being of the state and its representation is protected from "ideas". Insulting the state, its founder and its institutions is part of the criminal law in Turkey. And if it is believed that these ideas are expressed collectively, it suddenly becomes the subject of "terror" law and you stand trial for founding a "gang" to end or alter the state which is punishable by up to life sentence. Yes, I am still talking about expressions, not actions. These laws enable any prosecutor to file cases against any dissident writer, journalist, activist or politician at any point in time. Even if they are acquitted at the end, a lawsuit like that would last an average of five years, which is a form of punishment in itself. This layer of protection is used against opposition of any kind and form throughout the modern history of Turkey including years of "democracy" as well as the years of junta.
Closest to the ideal at the center comes, what has recently been called as "neighborhood pressure" by sociologist Serif Mardin. Since this fatherly figure of the state extends to personal perception of people, individuals perceive it almost sinful to propagate against the state or its declared values without even questioning their integrity. Friends and colleagues urge each other to prevent expressing "these kinds of opinions" either because they are totally wrong by definition, or because "it won't be good for the person" to express these opinions. "One should think about their children at the end".
Add to this thousands of missing people known within the last few decades, hundreds of more official killings during and after junta regimes of different decades, and annihilation of each and every "minority" during the last century in the country, one can now have a glimpse of a well established police state disguised very unsuccessfully as a developing democracy.
Hidden under very carefully drafted rhetoric, this is the tradition and justice system prevailing in Turkey now. One significant difference between now revolting Arab states and Turkey is the fact that in Arab states, dictators are considered a part of the regime, so actions are taken against the established power. In Turkey state is even above the people who represent it at any given time. People might consider themselves against one particular government or regime in Turkey. However that blinds them against the real culprit; the state that uses all these puppets called statesmen, feeding them with worldly rewards, using them as false targets to secure its permanence.
Turkish Republic, from its beginnings, and in resemblance with its predecessor Ottoman Empire, has had different layers of protection from defined or loosely accepted enemies. Although these have changed as times changed and priorities shifted, certain common denominators remained unchanged in its progress. Here, the idea on the center is the perception that the state is above the interest of all its citizens. State is a fatherly figure taking care of its "subjects", and knows "what's best for them" even better than any individual. When you extend the state that far, surely its "protection" would be a complex structure.
At this stage we see the "personification" of the state and the concepts that are related to it. On the outer sphere there are the usual suspects; laws against spying and acts of un-patriotic behavior. People are seldom caught by that net because these kind of accusations need through investigations and solid evidences against the accused. On the second layer there are the specific laws that derive from the "personification" of the state and its past and present representatives. As if the government is not elected by the people and for the people, they are continuously protected from the people including the civil servants. Even moral being of the state and its representation is protected from "ideas". Insulting the state, its founder and its institutions is part of the criminal law in Turkey. And if it is believed that these ideas are expressed collectively, it suddenly becomes the subject of "terror" law and you stand trial for founding a "gang" to end or alter the state which is punishable by up to life sentence. Yes, I am still talking about expressions, not actions. These laws enable any prosecutor to file cases against any dissident writer, journalist, activist or politician at any point in time. Even if they are acquitted at the end, a lawsuit like that would last an average of five years, which is a form of punishment in itself. This layer of protection is used against opposition of any kind and form throughout the modern history of Turkey including years of "democracy" as well as the years of junta.
Closest to the ideal at the center comes, what has recently been called as "neighborhood pressure" by sociologist Serif Mardin. Since this fatherly figure of the state extends to personal perception of people, individuals perceive it almost sinful to propagate against the state or its declared values without even questioning their integrity. Friends and colleagues urge each other to prevent expressing "these kinds of opinions" either because they are totally wrong by definition, or because "it won't be good for the person" to express these opinions. "One should think about their children at the end".
Add to this thousands of missing people known within the last few decades, hundreds of more official killings during and after junta regimes of different decades, and annihilation of each and every "minority" during the last century in the country, one can now have a glimpse of a well established police state disguised very unsuccessfully as a developing democracy.
Hidden under very carefully drafted rhetoric, this is the tradition and justice system prevailing in Turkey now. One significant difference between now revolting Arab states and Turkey is the fact that in Arab states, dictators are considered a part of the regime, so actions are taken against the established power. In Turkey state is even above the people who represent it at any given time. People might consider themselves against one particular government or regime in Turkey. However that blinds them against the real culprit; the state that uses all these puppets called statesmen, feeding them with worldly rewards, using them as false targets to secure its permanence.
Saturday, February 12, 2011
A New Epoque
Back in early 90's, I have to admit, I felt the chills. When I started my first company that pioneered Internet business of its kind, started my first Internet radio, or online paper, all in early 90's, I sincerely felt I was part of something new and incredible. But even in my boldest dreams, I underestimated Internet a great deal, it seems now. When it all started back in the States, before the age of corporate fundings, buyouts or Silicon Valley vultures, we were a bunch of dimwits trying to make it with a scarce dream. And the rest was history.
Or so we thought. We had to wait 15 or so years to witness what connectedness could alter in human history.
But that's not the purpose of this article. I will not brag about the peaceful revolution of the people, their braveness and so on, although yes, they wrote an unprecedented page in history, and yes, nothing will be the same ever again.
I wish to point out about the divide in this geography we call Middle East. The divide came out between the intrinsically autocratic societies like Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Eastern European nations and revolutionary nations of Middle East and North Africa. It's not a cultural divide, nor it is a political one. It's rather an educational and behavioral one.
Since the start of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, commentators and editors from all walks of life in Turkey were putting down Arabs and their motivations/intentions. Their innate hatred and scare of the "other" made them discount the numbers in Tahrir Square. (A columnist wrote there were only a few thousand demonstrators at most) And finally, supporters of "social democrat" party claimed that what happened in Egypt was a military coup and people were pawns directed by the army and the United States despite the panic and disorder in the State Department during the revolution.
Even in the most liberal of all media, commentators drove away from the possibility of an uprising of sorts in Turkey, where the government is moving towards an authoritarian regime day by day, where people are disappearing for more than 30 years never to be found again and court case after court case were opened against military high brass with accusations of coup attempts. Yet, public opinion still claims that Turkey should "export" its democracy to "poor Arabs".
Given the same tools and conditions of their Greek or Arab brothers, Turkish society is passive comparatively. (There is immense Internet use in Turkey (48% penetration), but statistics show widespread use is not for informative or communications purposes.) Small sporadic reactions in the form of demonstrations or rallies are met by the harsh and destructive response by police forces and dispersed immediately. If you criticize the state, there is always Code 301 against defamation of the state which could put you in jail for several years just for expressing your thoughts.
Small but growing number of the population is fighting for its rights albeit the tradition of full or semi military interventions that swiped many generations but their actions are closely monitored by the state and appropriate punishment (lawful or otherwise) is arbitrary.
But then again, you might say that the conditions in Egypt or Tunisia were no different. That's where the differences in perception play their role. The above conditions in Turkey are perceived to be normal by the majority of the population. Until the demand for democracy comes from the masses instead of being given different sets of democracies fit for the benefits of these or that group of autocrats in Turkey, hope for change is dependent upon the quality and purpose of popular politicians. And their interest, history shows, seldom coincide with the benefits of the people.
Or so we thought. We had to wait 15 or so years to witness what connectedness could alter in human history.
There was a debate on Twitter recently. About "the common man as a journo". Professionals of Turkish media all stated that they don't trust reporting capabilities of men on the streets. At the same time, many op-ed columnists were discriminating against Arab people, claiming that their lack of democratic experience would lead to their demise, once again as a people.In a country where the daily agenda is full of lawlessness, personal political vendettas and vicious circles, we did not see what was brewing right under our noses. Global economical crisis and increased means of communications enabled our neighbors to organize and develop a mass behavior like no other people done before. They gave passive resistance and peaceful activism a new name. They have started in Tunisia, broke the back of a thirty years old dictatorship in Egypt, and only God knows what's next.
But that's not the purpose of this article. I will not brag about the peaceful revolution of the people, their braveness and so on, although yes, they wrote an unprecedented page in history, and yes, nothing will be the same ever again.
I wish to point out about the divide in this geography we call Middle East. The divide came out between the intrinsically autocratic societies like Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Eastern European nations and revolutionary nations of Middle East and North Africa. It's not a cultural divide, nor it is a political one. It's rather an educational and behavioral one.
Since the start of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, commentators and editors from all walks of life in Turkey were putting down Arabs and their motivations/intentions. Their innate hatred and scare of the "other" made them discount the numbers in Tahrir Square. (A columnist wrote there were only a few thousand demonstrators at most) And finally, supporters of "social democrat" party claimed that what happened in Egypt was a military coup and people were pawns directed by the army and the United States despite the panic and disorder in the State Department during the revolution.
Even in the most liberal of all media, commentators drove away from the possibility of an uprising of sorts in Turkey, where the government is moving towards an authoritarian regime day by day, where people are disappearing for more than 30 years never to be found again and court case after court case were opened against military high brass with accusations of coup attempts. Yet, public opinion still claims that Turkey should "export" its democracy to "poor Arabs".
Someone wrote on Twitter that only Kurds could rise in Turkey, another one answered; "what do you think they are doing for the last 30 years?"In Turkey, rising against a regime is unthinkable. Only regime rising against its own people could be understood. Human life is dispensable, only state is everlasting. Even individual identity of a human being, even human dignity is minute. Mass graves are OK if you think people in them were acting against the state. "State knows better than we do, so if it's doing something to us, it's because it can think better than us". Discrimination is essential if a group is or perceived to be against the good of the state as a holy being.
Given the same tools and conditions of their Greek or Arab brothers, Turkish society is passive comparatively. (There is immense Internet use in Turkey (48% penetration), but statistics show widespread use is not for informative or communications purposes.) Small sporadic reactions in the form of demonstrations or rallies are met by the harsh and destructive response by police forces and dispersed immediately. If you criticize the state, there is always Code 301 against defamation of the state which could put you in jail for several years just for expressing your thoughts.
Small but growing number of the population is fighting for its rights albeit the tradition of full or semi military interventions that swiped many generations but their actions are closely monitored by the state and appropriate punishment (lawful or otherwise) is arbitrary.
But then again, you might say that the conditions in Egypt or Tunisia were no different. That's where the differences in perception play their role. The above conditions in Turkey are perceived to be normal by the majority of the population. Until the demand for democracy comes from the masses instead of being given different sets of democracies fit for the benefits of these or that group of autocrats in Turkey, hope for change is dependent upon the quality and purpose of popular politicians. And their interest, history shows, seldom coincide with the benefits of the people.
Friday, January 21, 2011
Saturday, January 15, 2011
Hrant
In our religion, we show respect in silence.
Today there are no politics, no human rights, no minorities, no big words.
Only hidden tears.
And a screaming longing.
Today we go to Hrant.
I miss him.
Today there are no politics, no human rights, no minorities, no big words.
Only hidden tears.
And a screaming longing.
Today we go to Hrant.
I miss him.
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